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ESCAPING A LIFE OF ABUSE: CHILDREN WHO KILL THEIR BATTERERS AND
THE PROPER ROLE OF “BATTERED CHILD SYNDROME” IN THEIR DEFENSE
Julie Rowe*
Parricide, when a child kills his or her parent, is an act
that naturally receives much attention in the media.  In the
United States, many firmly believe that children should respect
and obey their parents, regardless of the quality of their parent-
ing.1 The crime of parricide shocks the conscience of society,
challenging the widely accepted and revered commandment of
“honor your father and your mother.”2 Therefore, when a child
commits the gravest crime of murder against his or her own par-
ent, society reacts in astonishment and quickly advocates for
retribution.3 Yet, when a child who kills his or her parent has
been physically, sexually, or psychologically
abused by that parent, should society react differ-
ently?  
Recently, a highly publicized and tele-
vised murder trial illustrated the ever-increasing
dilemma of how to fairly treat a child who mur-
ders his or her parents, yet claims the murder was
in self-defense.  Cody Posey, now sixteen-years-
old, killed his father, step-mother, and sister in
July, 2004.4 At his trial, Cody’s defense attorney
presented evidence of the physical and emotional
abuse Cody suffered throughout his life.5 Witnesses testified
that Cody’s father severely physically abused him with shovels,
lariats, rocks, a hay hook, and other farm tools.6 In addition to
the physical abuse, Cody’s father humiliated and isolated
Cody.7 The night before the murder, at what was arguably
Cody’s breaking point, Cody’s father tried to force Cody to
have sex with his step-mother.8 The next day, after killing his
sister and step-mother, Cody shot his father as his father walked
through the door.9 After twelve hours of deliberation, the jury
found Cody guilty of voluntary manslaughter for the murder of
his father – a verdict much less severe than first-degree mur-
der.10
Cody Posey, like others who have killed an abusive
parent, may have believed that committing murder was the only
way to escape a life characterized by hurt, fear and shame.11
How should society and the criminal justice system treat abused
children who do not receive help from other adults in their life
and see no other alternative but murder?  How can the court sys-
tem adequately uphold the fundamental principle of retribution,
yet appropriately seek rehabilitation for these psychologically
damaged and distraught children?  
This paper seeks to explore the intricacies of parricide
when committed by a juvenile in a non-confrontational situa-
tion.  Part II will focus on the characteristics of parricide, the
victims, and the offenders.  Part III will examine defenses and
strategies available to parricide offenders, certain state statutes
that allow for expert testimony regarding “Battered Child
Syndrome,” and important cases dealing with this issue.  Part
IV will analyze an appropriate judicial response to battered
children and advocate for a more unified understanding of 
“Battered Child Syndrome” in the courts.  Part V will conclude
the discussion.   
Characteristics of the Typical Crime
Although it is usually highly publicized, parricide is
“the rarest form of intra-family homicide,” accounting for only
two percent of all homicides annually.12 Sons killing one or
both parents account for approximately 90% of all parricides,
and the least frequent form of parricide involves daughters
killing their mothers.13
When a child commits parricide, he or she
usually commits the murder in a seemingly cold
and calculating manner.14 The child frequently
kills in a nonconfrontational situation when the
parent is sleeping, watching TV, or looking
away.15 Parricide is rarely committed when the
child is in the midst of a violent confrontation
with the parent.16 Absent a crime scene involv-
ing a violent struggle or confrontation, prosecu-
tors seek first-degree murder for these offenders.  
Society may initially judge parricide offenders as way-
ward youths, depraved and devoid of morals or conscience.  On
the contrary, children who commit parricide usually do so in
response to years of extreme physical or psychological abuse.17
In recent estimations, 90% of all parricides are committed by
children who have suffered abuse at the hands of their parents
over a long period of time.18 In some cases, a child feels he or
she must act because of fear that his or her own death is immi-
nent.19 Many children believe that killing one or both parents
is the only way to stop the abuse and free themselves from a life
lived in constant fear.20
Characteristics of the Victims (a.k.a. the Abusers)
Parents who severely abuse their children and are con-
sequently murdered by their children may not be distinguish-
able from other parents.21 They are generally hard-working
without any criminal history, yet they may tend to have intimi-
dating or controlling personalities.22 The type of parent who is
killed by his or her child “doesn’t care about reforming the
child’s behavior – instead he is addicted to his power over the
child and the pleasure derived from exercising it.”23 Many
times, a parent such as this will couple physical abuse with
severe psychological abuse.  The parent may accomplish this by
rejecting, isolating, exploiting, or berating the child.24 This
type of verbal abuse is usually accompanied by severe domina-
tion, and the child may be “controlled so strictly that the
parental restraint amounts to virtual imprisonment.”25
In reality, parents kill their children by abuse or neg-
lect ten times as often as children kill their parents.26 In
California, 133 children died from child abuse or neglect in
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2001.27 Nationally, in 2003, 1,500 children were killed by their
parents, and 78.7% of those children were under three years
old.28 Clearly, child abuse is a serious problem in the United
States, causing a large number of deaths annually.  Yet when
children fight back against the abuse, after failed attempts to
receive help from relatives or social services, they are ushered
into the court system as the worst kind of criminals.  
Characteristics of the Child Offenders
Most children who commit parricide have been physi-
cally harmed for extended amounts of time and are frequently
psychologically damaged as well.   Dr. C. Henry Kempe intro-
duced the term “Battered Child Syndrome” in a 1962 study  to
describe “a clinical condition in young children who have
received serious physical abuse, generally from a parent or fos-
ter parent.”   Battered Child Syndrome was primarily used to
prosecute child abusers, and courts began to allow expert med-
ical testimony regarding Battered Child
Syndrome to prove that a child had been physi-
cally abused over long periods of time.   Yet
there are many psychological and emotional ele-
ments of Battered Child Syndrome that have not
yet gained proper recognition in the social work
arena or the court system.   Unless social work-
ers, attorneys, and courts take notice of the
severe psychological trauma resulting from a
lifetime of abuse, the true root of parricide will
remain unexposed and these children’s acts of desperation will
be seen as nothing more than random, heartless violence.  
Helplessness and Self-Blame
The average parricide offender does not have a reputa-
tion of violence or aggression.34 On the contrary, he or she is
usually intelligent, compliant, respectful of adults, and polite.35
While some prefer to be alone and isolate themselves, many
appear to pose no threat to society.36 Underneath the docile and
somewhat fragile façade, however, are the emotional scars of
abuse.37 “Prolonged exposure to severe and unpredictable abuse
results in feelings of powerlessness, embarrassment, constant
fear, self-blame, depression, isolation, low self-esteem, and fear
of reprisal by the abuser on themselves or other family mem-
bers.”38 Instead of responding aggressively, battered children
learn to adapt to their environment and cope with the parent’s
actions by avoiding situations that trigger abuse or devising
techniques to endure the abuse.39
Often, battered children do not trust others with infor-
mation about the abuse.40 Many times, the child’s parent will
threaten him or her with death or serious injury if he or she
reports the abuse to anyone.41 Sometimes, when a child does
seek help, he or she fails to receive adequate support from rela-
tives, schools, or social agencies.42 Social agencies are often
reluctant to investigate allegations of child abuse if the child
cannot show immediate signs of physical harm, such as bruises
or welts.43 Also, many hold to the belief that what occurs inside
a family’s home is private and should not be questioned or inter-
fered with by those on the outside.44 Whatever the reason for
their inaction, adults and social agencies should be aware that
one of the main factors that lead a child to commit parricide is
the feeling of helplessness that results from a lack of outside
support or help.45 In fact, when adults know about the abuse
and do nothing, the child may naturally infer that all adults con-
done the abusive behavior.46 This only adds to the child’s sense
of helplessness.47
An abused child also harbors feelings of self-blame.48
Because of the nature of the parent-child relationship, children
naturally bond with and connect to their parents regardless of
how they are treated.49 Even if the parent is abusive, he or she
is still the primary caretaker of the child, and the child depends
on the parent for his or her emotional, physical, and financial
needs.50 Extended periods of abuse can disfigure a child’s sense
of self, causing him or her to blame himself for the abuse and
seek to please the parent even more.51 Feelings of helplessness
and self-blame can build, leading the child to believe that there
is no alternative but to murder the parent.52
Psychological Effects
Two important psychological conditions or
disorders characterize a child suffering from
Battered Child Syndrome: hypervigilance and
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).53
Both are important to consider if the child seeks
to claim self-defense at his or her trial for mur-
der.
A hyper-vigilant child is one who is “acutely
aware of his or her environment and who
remains on the alert for any signs of danger.”54 They look for
clues in their parent’s behavior and mannerisms and learn to
judge when the parent is in a pre-aggressing state or when the
threat of violence is imminent.55 Therefore, they are constant-
ly monitoring the situation in order to predict violence and
impending abuse.56 After this type of monitoring becomes rou-
tine, the child will learn to react to certain stimuli that might
accompany certain threats, actions, or looks from the parent.57
An understanding of hyper-vigilance aids a trier of fact
in a murder trial because it illustrates why a child may feel that
abuse is imminent when, in fact, the parent is not yet inflicting
violence.58 In an abusive relationship, threats of imminent dan-
ger manifest in subtle cues and are not easily perceived by oth-
ers.59 Therefore, an abused child might sense impending vio-
lence and react by killing the parent in a non-confrontational sit-
uation, when the child knows he or she will be successful and
not suffer immediate harm.60
PTSD is similar to hyper-vigilance but is defined as “an
anxiety-related disorder which occurs in response to traumatic
events outside the normal range of human experience.”61 A
child with PTSD will likely suffer from severe anxiety, hyperac-
tivity, episodes of terror, nightmares, and fatigue.62 The highest
level of PTSD “involves heightened symptoms of hyperactivity,
vigilance, scanning, and motor tension, fixation on somatic
symptoms believed to have resulted from the traumatic event,
and a secondary manifestation of depression.”63 A court faced
with a child accused of murdering their parent should evaluate
the reasonableness of the child’s actions in light of the debilitat-
ing effects of these disorders.  The court should take into account
any psychological conditions from which the child suffers to
lessen or mitigate the charge or sentence. 
In reality, parents kill their
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Available Defenses
Inevitably, a child who kills a parent will be prosecut-
ed.  If the child is fourteen-years-old or older, he or she will
likely be tried in adult criminal court exclusively, bypassing the
juvenile court altogether because of the nature of his or her
crime.64 Statutory waiver, as this process is known, creates the
possibility that the child could receive any applicable adult sen-
tence.65 He or she could be charged with murder, and in the
worst case scenario, receive life in prison without possibility of
parole.66
It is important, therefore, to effectively communicate
to a jury the special circumstances under which the child com-
mitted the crime.  It is difficult for a child who commits parri-
cide in a non-confrontational situation to claim self-defense or
show the existence of mitigating circumstances.  Thus, expert
testimony is necessary to educate the jury about the child’s past
history, subjective state of mind, and sense of danger at the time
of the murder.67
Insanity
A parricide offender suffering from PTSD may be able
to utilize an insanity defense by using expert testimony to show
he or she suffered from a mental defect that prevented him or
her from either comprehending his or her act or from freely
choosing that act.68 If an expert can testify affirmatively that
the child suffers from PTSD and a jury believes that the child
was not acting out of his own free will at the time of the crime,
the child may be able to successfully defend against the murder
charge.69
Although a successful insanity defense will save a par-
ricide offender from prison, the child may then be committed to
a mental institution, which may be an equally undesirable out-
come.70 Depending on the child’s case, considering factors
such as length of abuse, psychological disorders, and incidents
leading to the murder, a better defense strategy may either be
self-defense or mitigation of the charge or sentence.  
Self-Defense
If successful, a parricide offender’s self-defense claim
will result in an acquittal, making it the child’s best hope for
exoneration.71 Most jurisdictions will allow claims of self-
defense only if the defendant reasonably believed that death or
serious bodily harm was imminent.72 In California, juries are
required to apply the objective standard of a “reasonable per-
son” to determine if the defendant’s acts were reasonable in
light of the imminent threat of danger.73 Yet if the child kills the
parent in the absence of any violent confrontation, a jury may
be reluctant to believe the killing was in self-defense without
any evidence of “imminent danger.”74
The most difficult issue facing parricide offenders is
how to successfully prove to a jury that the danger they faced
was “imminent” and that a “reasonable person” in the battered
child’s situation would have acted in the same manner.75 The
objective standard of a “reasonable person” is a hard standard
to reach without expert testimony regarding Battered Child
Syndrome.76 The average juror has likely never experienced
the life of an abused child and therefore cannot easily compre-
hend the mental state of the defendant.77 Expert testimony
regarding Battered Child Syndrome seeks to prove that the
child lived in an environment where the threat of abuse was per-
sistently imminent and where he or she could sense when the
next incident of abuse would occur.78 Thus, expert testimony
on the psychological elements of Battered Child Syndrome cou-
pled with the defendant’s testimony of his or her history of
abuse is essential, for it explains to the jury that his or her belief
of imminent danger was real.79 Also, it is important for the jury
to take into account any incident that occurred directly before
the murder, causing the child to believe his or her life was in
danger.80
The court may still be reluctant to acquit a child who
killed his or her parent in a non-confrontational situation
because of society’s policy of properly punishing those who
take another’s life.81 Also, courts may be reluctant to allow a
defense that may encourage other battered children to kill their
abusers without first attempting to seek outside help.82
However, in these instances, expert testimony may be relevant
at trial to either lessen the charges or to encourage a lighter,
more rehabilitative-based sentence.
Mitigation or Partial Excuse
A child who commits parricide may offer evidence
regarding the history of abuse and extent of psychological dam-
age to prove his or her lessened moral culpability, thereby par-
tially excusing or mitigating the crime.83 A partial excuse, in
general, allows the jury to consider the defendant’s subjective
state of mind at the time of the murder, whereas a self-defense
claim employs a more objective standard.84 A murder may be
partially excused according to the doctrine of provocation,
Within the Court System: Available Defenses, Pivotal
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which recognizes the objective external pressures the child
faced, or the “internal pressures of a reasonably explained
extreme mental or emotional disturbance.”85
This approach of excuse or mitigation may be the most
attractive to the defendant, for the jury can focus on the defen-
dant’s specific history of abuse and subsequently lessen his or
her punishment for the crime.  The jury can therefore express its
understanding of the defendant’s actions, yet still hold him or
her accountable for the crime.86 In most jurisdictions, a defen-
dant offering a partial excuse is eligible to receive a conviction
for voluntary manslaughter, defined as “an intentional homicide
committed under extenuating circumstances which serve to mit-
igate the killing.”87
According to existing U.S. Supreme Court case law, a
judge and jury must consider an array of mitigating factors
when determining a proper sentence for a juvenile offender.  In
Lockett v. Ohio,88 the Court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments require that a judge consider any
mitigating factors the defendant offers as rea-
sons for a sentence less than death.89 Similarly,
in Eddings v. Oklahoma,90 the Court remanded
a sixteen-year-old defendant’s case to the trial
court because the trial court failed to consider
the defendant’s age, emotional development,
and family background before deciding whether
or not to impose the death sentence.91 Although
these two cases dealt specifically with juveniles
facing the death penalty, their main tenets
remain applicable for any juvenile who offers
mitigating factors to reduce his or her sentence
at trial.  Also, these cases are important for bat-
tered children, for the right to offer mitigating factors was
declared to be a Constitutional right.  
While cases such as Lockett and Eddings ensure that
parricide offenders can offer mitigating evidence of their abu-
sive histories to potentially lessen their ultimate sentences, they
do not specifically allow expert testimony regarding Battered
Child Syndrome at trial.  If a battered child seeks to mitigate his
or her charge of first-degree murder, expert testimony would be
a great aid to the judge and jury to help them understand the
intricacies and particular characteristics of Battered Child
Syndrome.  Some state courts and legislatures have begun to
realize the necessity of expert testimony in this area, however
this realization is not universal among jurisdictions. 
Case Law Regarding Battered Child Syndrome Testimony
and Self-Defense
As stated earlier, the term “Battered Child Syndrome”
originated as a medical diagnosis, and expert medical testimo-
ny on the syndrome was widely used to prosecute child
abusers.92 California was one of the first states to recognize
Battered Child Syndrome as a valid medical diagnosis.  In
1971, in People v. Jackson,93 the California Court of Appeals
upheld the trial court’s use of expert testimony on Battered
Child Syndrome because it found that the syndrome was based
on extensive studies in medical science and was useful to prove
that the child’s injuries were inflicted intentionally as opposed
to the result of an accident.94
Even though case law in many states recognizes
Battered Child Syndrome as substantiated medical science,
states have been reluctant to allow the use of expert testimony
regarding the psychological aspects of Battered Child
Syndrome in the defense of parricide offenders.95 Because a
defendant may offer evidence of mitigating factors in a murder
trial, regardless of a claim of self-defense, the largest existing
dispute in state courts is whether to allow expert testimony
when the defendant claims self-defense to prove the child killed
in response to a perceived “imminent” threat of danger.96
Because of the child’s long history of abuse, the child’s percep-
tion of impending danger leads to the belief that he or she acted
reasonably under the circumstances.97 Expert testimony could
aid the jury in its understanding of the child’s perceptions.
State v. Janes: Landmark Case
State courts have only recently begun to recognize and
accept testimony regarding Battered Child Syndrome in parri-
cide cases.  The Washington Supreme Court, in
State v. Janes,98 wrote the first judicial decision
validating expert testimony on Battered Child
Syndrome in 1993.99 Seventeen-year-old
Andrew Janes killed his mother’s boyfriend,
Walter Jaloveckas, in 1988.100 Andrew shot
Walter with a pistol as Walter walked in the door
of their home after returning from work.101 At
trial, evidence was presented that Walter physi-
cally and emotionally abused Andrew for over
ten years, and Andrew witnessed Walter abuse
both his mother and younger brother.102
Witnesses to Walter’s abuse of Andrew called
Child Protective Services numerous times, but no action was
ever taken.103 On the night before the murder, Walter yelled at
Andrew’s mother for a long period of time, then leaned his head
into Andrew’s room and spoke to him in a threatening voice.104
The next day, Andrew videotaped himself and left a message
including the statement: “I don’t want this life anymore.  So I
shall take care of the problem myself.  Mom, if you find this, I
hope you will forgive me.  I’m doing this in your best wish-
es.”105
At trial, Andrew’s attorney proffered a psychiatrist to
testify that he suffered from PTSD which impaired his ability to
premeditate.106 The expert was also willing to testify that
Andrew feared imminent harm on the day he shot Walter.107
Yet the trial judge excluded this expert testimony and denied
Andrew’s attorney’s request for a self-defense instruction.108
The Washington Supreme Court heard the case to
resolve whether “expert testimony regarding ‘Battered Child
Syndrome’ is generally admissible to aid in the proof of self-
defense.”109 Holding that expert testimony could aid the jury in
understanding the reasonableness of the defendant’s percep-
tions, the court upheld the use of Battered Child Syndrome in
cases where a defendant claims self-defense.110
Subsequent Cases Considering Battered Child Syndrome
Testimony
The Supreme Court of Ohio has issued decisions in
line with Janes.  Brian Nemeth, a sixteen-year-old Ohio resi-
Whereas the child should not
be able to escape 
responsibility for murder, his
or her unique circumstances
must be taken into account to
bring about true justice.  
Fall 2006 30
dent, shot his mother five times in the head with a bow and
arrow.111 Nemeth’s mother had physically and emotionally
abused him for several years, and she was an excessive
drinker.112  At Nemeth’s murder trial, the trial court judge
denied his request to offer expert testimony regarding Battered
Child Syndrome and denied a jury instruction on voluntary
manslaughter.113 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio, con-
sidered “whether Ohio recognizes Battered Child Syndrome as
a valid topic for expert testimony in the defense of parricide.”114
The Court answered in the affirmative after considering
Nemeth’s past history of abuse, the content of the proffered
expert testimony, and the expert’s ability to aid the jury’s under-
standing of the issues of the case.115 Although it held that
Battered Child Syndrome itself cannot be a defense, the Court
recognized that expert testimony regarding the defendant’s
impaired psychological ability should be offered in support of a
self-defense claim or as a justification for a lesser included
offense.116
Similarly, in State v. Smullen, the Maryland Court of
Appeals held that although Battered Child Syndrome cannot be
a complete defense, it may be offered in parricide cases to show
that the defendant responded to a reasonable, honestly per-
ceived, imminent threat of death.117 A few courts in various
other states have handed down similar decisions, but the per-
centage of states that allow expert testimony on Battered Child
Syndrome through judicial precedent is small.118 Some states
have actually rejected a parricide offender’s attempt to offer
evidence of Battered Child Syndrome at trial; however, the
majority of states have not yet considered this issue.119
Legislative Response
Only a few states have enacted legislation regarding
the admissibility of Battered Child Syndrome in parricide cases.
Louisiana and Texas are the pioneers in this area, for each state
has specific legislation that defines Battered Child Syndrome
and permits evidence of the effects of abuse in parricide trials
where self-defense is at issue.120 Similarly, Arizona and Ohio
both have statutes in which Battered Child Syndrome is made
available through court rulings; for example, Ohio’s Evidence
Rule 702 has case notes providing that expert testimony on
Battered Child Syndrome should be admissible when it is rele-
vant and meets the requirements of the statute.121
Considering that only a few states have addressed
Battered Child Syndrome in either their courts or legislatures, it
is evident that our justice system does not sufficiently recognize
the long history of abuse suffered by most parricide offend-
ers.122 Even if the general public would support statutes that
allow expert testimony on Battered Child Syndrome, courts will
be reluctant to allow it if society’s sentiments are not eventual-
ly codified.  
A child who has endured a lifetime of abuse and sees
murder as the only viable escape from that life deserves mercy
in the courts and in the eyes of the public.  Yet the way these
children carry out their crimes affects the way they are viewed
by society and how they are prosecuted.  At first glance, a crime
involving a child who kills his or her parent while the parent is
sleeping or engaging in a non-threatening activity is one of the
worst possible crimes.  Many may advocate that justice must be
done and affirm the fundamental principle of retribution.  But in
this context, when a child is responding to years of physical and
emotional abuse, how is justice properly defined and executed?  
The Lesser Culpability of Battered Children Must Be
Recognized 
The U.S. Supreme Court recently opined that juve-
niles, as a class, are less morally culpable for their crimes; in
two specific cases involving juveniles accused of first degree
murder, the Court overturned death sentences on the basis of the
defendants’ lessened culpability.123 In Thompson v. Oklahoma,
the Court declared that juveniles are “less mature and responsi-
ble than adults,” “less able to evaluate the consequences of
[their] conduct,” and “more apt to be motivated by mere emo-
tion or peer pressure.”124 Therefore, any crime a juvenile com-
mits cannot be as “morally reprehensible as that of an adult.”125
Likewise, in Roper v. Simmons, the Court stated that juveniles’
“vulnerability and comparative lack of control over their imme-
diate surroundings mean [they] have a greater claim than adults
to be forgiven for failing to escape negative influences in their
whole environment.”126
If the U.S. Supreme Court has determined that juve-
niles in general possess these characteristics, certainly courts
should recognize the diminished culpability of a physically or
emotionally abused child.  A battered child’s psychological
awareness is usually heightened depending on the length and
severity of abuse, and the child will usually perceive that he or
she is in constant imminent danger.127 A battered child who
lives in perpetual fear and hyper-vigilance will be more likely
to strike out against an abuser than a child residing in a more
functional environment.128
Another important factor to recognize is that children
are unable to escape their environment.129 Children, in gener-
al, are economically and emotionally dependent on their par-
ents.130 Running away is illegal, and law enforcement officials
and social work agencies will simply return a run-away child to
his or her home.131 No shelters exist for battered children,132
and children cannot support themselves apart from their par-
ents.133
The special circumstances leading to parricide must be
considered by the justice system.  First, the U.S. Supreme Court
has declared that juveniles, even those who kill, should be held
less morally responsible for their crimes.  Second, battered chil-
dren do not possess the characteristics of an average child.
Third, abused children have no way to escape the abuse because
they are dependent on their parents for support.  Considering all
of these characteristics, society should not hold a battered child
to the same standard as others who murder in non-confrontation-
al situations.  Yet the question remains: should society excuse a
crime as serious as murder?
Core Principles of the Criminal Justice System Should Be
Preserved
In parricide cases, the traditional philosophies under-
lying homicide and self-defense may become blurry if society
tries to accommodate an abused child who kills his or her par-
Analysis: The Proper Role of Battered Child Syndrome
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ent.134 Courts may wonder how to balance society’s interest in
both protecting children from abuse and punishing murderers
for their crimes.135
Certain theories about the purpose of criminal law are
woven throughout the common law, current case law, statutory
regulations, and the general sentiment of the American public.
The law serves to protect individuals from harm by discourag-
ing self-help and prosecuting those who break the law and
injure others.136 Our society’s laws indicate that life is valuable
and that society as a whole should adhere to a certain standard
of conduct.137 Rightly then, the most severe sentences are
imposed on those who kill other human beings.  Still, American
laws recognize that there may be instances where an individual
must kill to save his or her own life, and these murders may be
excused only in the most “narrow, societal-determined set of
circumstances.”138
Many scholars argue that by allowing expert testimo-
ny on Battered Child Syndrome in parricide cases, the doctrine
of self-defense will be severely compro-
mised.139 In most jurisdictions, self-defense is
determined by the objective standard of a “rea-
sonable person.”140 Yet in parricide cases, the
defense often asks the jury to consider expert
testimony regarding the defendant’s subjective
state of mind at the time of the killing.141
Additionally, when the child kills in a non-con-
frontational setting, the established requirement
that the threat be “imminent” is hard to satis-
fy.142 Public policy demands that the require-
ments for self-defense be strict to prevent “pre-
emptive strikes, self-help, and retaliatory
killings.”143 In parricide cases, it may be hard for a jury to dis-
tinguish between a child who genuinely sensed imminent harm
and a child who killed his or her parent for revenge.144
Allowing expert testimony on Battered Child
Syndrome in support of a self-defense claim could unnecessar-
ily weaken the doctrine of self-defense by allowing considera-
tion of subjective rather than objective factors and by broaden-
ing the definition of “imminence.”  As such, for preservation of
society’s fundamental notions of criminal justice and self-
defense, Battered Child Syndrome should not be used as a per-
fect defense in parricide cases to acquit the parricide offend-
er.145
What is “Justice” in a Parricide Case?
While courts have a duty to preserve the narrow doc-
trine of self-defense, they also must uphold society’s duty to
protect children from the abuse of their parents.146 Society
should bestow compassion upon abused children who kill by
allowing them to offer expert testimony regarding Battered
Child Syndrome at trial to mitigate or lessen their sentences.147
The history of abuse, the severity of the abuse, the child’s psy-
chological makeup, and the child’s perceptions at the time of
the murder should all be taken into account by a judge and jury
when considering how to charge and sentence the juvenile.
Whereas the child should not be able to escape responsibility
for murder, his or her unique circumstances must be taken into
account to bring about true justice.148 True justice for these
children can be achieved through creative and rehabilitative-
based sentences to both appease society’s need for retribution
and the child’s need for counseling and restoration.149
If a parricide offender can prove, through expert and
other testimony, that he had an honest yet unreasonable belief of
imminent danger, he may receive a lesser charge than first-
degree murder.150 In many cases, if a defendant shows that his
actions were affected by extenuating circumstances, his charge
may be lessened to voluntary manslaughter.151 Charging a par-
ricide offender with voluntary manslaughter, and sentencing
him accordingly, would uphold society’s interest in preserving
the self-defense doctrine while at the same time saving the child
from long and harsh prison terms reserved for those who com-
mit first-degree murder.152
For example, in the Cody Posey case, the judge could
have convicted the child of first degree murder with a sentence
of life in prison without possibility of parole but instead chose
to convict him only of voluntary manslaughter for killing his
father.  If testimony regarding Battered Child
Syndrome had not been admitted in order to
show the extensive abuse Cody endured
throughout his life, the court system would have
failed him by not pursuing true justice.  
Many states have not yet codified any specif-
ic provision for battered children who commit
parricide, but the admissibility of Battered Child
Syndrome should be considered by legislatures
nationwide.  A child who commits parricide in
one state may experience “justice” differently
depending solely on the jurisdiction in which he
or she lives.  Therefore it is imperative that all
states allow abused children to present evidence of their subjec-
tive state of mind at trial.  
The concept of rehabilitating wayward youth is a foun-
dational principle of the juvenile justice system.153 As such, it
would be proper to prescribe more rehabilitative sentences for
juveniles who can affirmatively show that they have the ability
to be rehabilitated.154 Abused children who kill their batterers
pose little threat to society – in reality, they are not violent by
nature.155 What these children need primarily is intensive ther-
apy and placement in an environment that will encourage them
to begin their lives as contributing members of society.156
A few judges have recognized the needs of these chil-
dren and have creatively sentenced abused parricide offenders.
A Maryland judge sentenced a parricide offender convicted of
voluntary manslaughter to eight years in prison, which was sus-
pended, probation, and participation in a program for emotion-
ally disturbed children for two years.157 Similarly, a judge con-
sidering the case of another parricide offender sentenced the
juvenile to probation and ordered him to perform eight hundred
hours of community service, teaching reading, writing, and
arithmetic to prisoners in jail.158  In the case of Cody Posey, to
the shock of many in the legal community, the judge sentenced
Cody to six years in a juvenile detention facility, until his 21st
birthday.159 Contributing to the judge’s decision was the expert
testimony establishing that Cody suffered from PTSD and was
able to be rehabilitated.160
As shown in these cases, judges play pivotal roles in
the trials and sentencing of juvenile parricide offenders.  They
Those who knew, but were
afraid to act; those who
knew, but decided it was
none of their business ... all
share with the abused child
and his or her parents some
moral responsibility for the
ultimate tragedy.
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must first allow expert testimony on Battered Child Syndrome
to demonstrate the offender’s lessened culpability, and then
they must creatively sentence these juveniles to rehabilitative
treatment.  Only then will true justice for these abused children
be achieved.  
Paul Mones, a defender of children who commit parri-
cide, has insightfully stated: “[t]hose who knew, but were afraid
to act; those who knew, but decided it was none of their busi-
ness; and even those who tried in some small way to help, but
then gave up: all share with the abused child and his or her par-
ents some moral responsibility for the ultimate tragedy.”161 It is
true that murder under any circumstances is a tragedy.  But
when a child has been severely physically and mentally abused
throughout his or her lifetime, receives no help from the outside
world, and ultimately kills his or her parent to escape the night-
mare of abuse, society struggles to respond appropriately.    
Parricide offenders most often suffer from psycholog-
ical and social disorders as a result of the abuse, and if state leg-
islatures and courts do not recognize Battered Child Syndrome,
these children may receive unnecessarily harsh sentences in
prison.  Justice requires that expert testimony regarding
Battered Child Syndrome be admitted at trial, not to acquit the
juvenile but to lessen or mitigate the charge or sentence.  Only
then will the juvenile have the chance to become a healthy, con-
tributing member of society.  
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